Agrarian societies require offspring to continue food production and support elders when they are no longer able to work.
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From: An Introduction to Real Estate Finance, 2014
Johan Goudsblom, in Encyclopedia of Energy, 2004
2.3 Fire in Settled Agrarian Societies
In all agrarian societies with permanent settlements, new uses of fire and new attitudes toward fire developed. During the long first stage of human fire use, the main concern always was to keep the communal fire burning. From now on, however, the main concern became almost the opposite: to keep the fires that were lit for numerous purposes from spreading and from running out of control.
The uses of fire became increasingly more varied. Specialized pyrotechnic crafts emerged, such as blacksmiths and potters. Among the growing urban populations, fire was regarded with greater anxiety, for several reasons: with the proliferation of fires, the risks of conflagrations increased, and with the accumulation of property, people had more to loose.
Of course, it was fire as a natural force with its self-generating destructiveness that was feared. But more and more, this natural force manifested itself almost exclusively in the guise of anthropogenic fire. With all the fires burning in a city, one moment of carelessness might cause a conflagration. People had to rely on other people's caution. They had to oppress attempts at deliberate fire setting. And they had to reckon with the very worst danger: the organized form of murder and arson known as war.
A common problem in all advanced agrarian societies was the prevention of uncontrolled fire in cities. This problem may have been less urgent where the major construction material was stone or brick; but throughout the agrarian era we find major cities in which most houses were built from timber. Rome, Constantinople, Moscow, London, and Delhi as well as the capitals of China, Korea and Japan all suffered conflagrations; all of them faced problems of fire prevention.
Today we may tend to conceive of problems of fire prevention primarily in terms of technology: of building materials and technical equipment. However, the problems were (and still are) at least as much civilizational, or social. The crucial issue was human behavior, care, consideration. According to a well-known story, a temple in ancient Greece burned down because the servant was careless; similar events must have occurred all over the world. Everywhere it was the human factor that counted most of all.
This was also reflected in the presence or absence of fire brigades. Today, it may seem self-evident that a city should have a fire brigade. However, the power relations in earlier societies could be such that the authorities would forbid the organization of fire brigades by citizens. A dramatic example of a ban put on urban fire brigades is provided by two letters that were exchanged in the second century ce between the governor of a province in the eastern part of the Roman empire, Pliny the Younger, and his emperor, Trajan. In the first letter, Pliny informed the emperor that the capital city Nicomedia was completely ruined by a fire; people had watched the blaze passively, unable to do anything. He therefore asked permission to establish a fire brigade of citizens in order to prevent such disasters in the future. The emperor denied the request bluntly, for—as Pliny should have known—such an organization of citizens could easily turn into a club with subversive political activities.
It is still unknown to what degree Trajan's reply was typical of rulers in agrarian empires. The scattered evidence provided by local histories suggests that the situation was very different in the towns of medieval Europe, where the members of various guilds were required to take a share in fighting fires. This issue is a promising subject for comparative historical research.
Ronald Skeldon, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015
Migration as an Integral Part of Development
At the simplest level, migration in a premodern agrarian society was very different from that associated with a modern, highly urbanized society today; not that the former was static (it was not) and the latter highly mobile, but the means, speed, volume, and composition of the flows of migration in the two societies are very different. Available technology determines how fast and frequently people move. Hence, if technology is how we measure development, the relationship is fairly clear. In the year 1774, some 265 ships carried 5027 migrants from English and Scottish ports to the Americas, an average of 19 emigrants per ship (Bailyn, 1987: p. 101). Almost exactly a century later, in 1873, 17 companies were operating 173 steamships between Europe and New York (Nugent, 1992: pp. 31–32), many carrying more than a 1000 passengers each. Over a century later again, in 2007, there were some 425 000 flights across the Atlantic, and International Air Transport Association (IATA) forecasts are for 3.6 billion passengers worldwide in 2016, up from the 2.8 billion in 2011 (IATA, 2012). Clearly, most people who fly today are not migrants setting out on a new life but short-term travellers on business or vacation. Nevertheless, these travellers are both producers and consumers of a global economy that can only exist through our ability to move further, faster, more frequently, and more safely than ever before. Development, in its broadest sense, has been associated with increased movements of people and the emergence of different forms of population movement, which complicate any simple approach to migration and development.
United Nations estimates placed the number of international migrants in the world at 232 million in 2013, around 3% of the population (United Nations, 2013). While the absolute numbers of migrants had increased from 154 million in 1990 and 175 million in 2000, the proportion of the world's population that was defined as migrant under United Nations definitions had remained around the 3% mark. One can argue that the increased numbers of people migrating and moving are simply the result of an increase in global population numbers from 5.3 billion in 1990 to 7 billion in 2012.
Although the number of migrants in the world is a function of the size of the population, the resultant numbers of movers are not a simple outcome of that expansion. Nevertheless, this introduces into the equation those aspects of development in agriculture, industry, public health, housing, medicine, and transport that have contributed to the decline in mortality, the modern rise in population numbers, and the subsequent decline in fertility. How all these variables, and more, interact to generate migration and development outcomes creates a complexity that is captured in the idea of a ‘nexus’ as in ‘the migration-development nexus’ in which all things are connected (Faist et al., 2011; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002; Mossin Brønden, 2012; Phillips, 2011). Migration and development, however defined, are two processes that vary across space and through time, and it seems relevant to commence the discussion with approaches that attempt to conceptualize the complexity from this point of view.
Veljko Vujacic, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015
Gellner (1983) starts with an ideal type of agrarian societies; their central feature is an ideologically buttressed functional division of labor that separates the ‘high culture’ of a hereditary administrative-military ruling class and universal clerisy from the ‘low cultures’ of socially isolated and illiterate peasant communities. This status segregation has a cognitive dimension as well: the world is experienced as culturally and ontologically heterogeneous.
A profound change occurs with the modern cognitive revolution. The world is now seen as a coherent whole subject to universal laws expressed in a unitary linguistic idiom. The social correlate of this cognitive revolution is industrialism. If intellectual progress presupposes the perpetual exploration of reality, the idea of unlimited growth demands the constant redrawing of traditional social boundaries and roles in line with the functional requirements of the division of labor. These requirements can be met only by a common linguistic idiom transmitted through standardized education. Literacy in a shared language prepares individuals for new functional roles, increases their mobility prospects, and facilitates communication among strangers in an impersonal world. The emergence of a shared culture favors nationalism as a political principle which holds that the state must rest on the foundation of national culture; the state, in turn, acquires a new source of legitimacy (cf. Weber). Thus, industrialism is a necessary condition of nationalism. Ethnicity is secondary; it is nationalism that invents nations.
Finally, nationalism disseminates through uneven development. In a typical imperial (e.g., Habsburg) situation, an ethnic division of labor is present; the carriers of high culture belong to one ethnic group (or groups), those of low culture to another (or others). The social exclusion of the aspiring intelligentsia of the subordinate group leads it to adopt ethnic nationalism as a strategy of collective mobility (e.g., Czech nationalism). In contrast, ‘diaspora nationalism’ develops among politically excluded high culture pariah groups (e.g., Jews). The ideal case is a mature industrial society in which elites and masses share a standardized idiom and consider themselves to be conationals in a common state.
Gellner’s elegant theory has enjoyed enormous influence. It can be criticized on several grounds: (1) the theory does not specify a causal (group) agent, nationalism is seen as a byproduct of the impersonal process of industrialization; (2) nationalism can precede industrialization (e.g., Balkan nationalism); (3) nations can precede nationalism; and (4) nations are rooted in premodern, ethnic identities (see Section Comparative–Historical Sociology).
Sylvia Lorek, Joachim H. Spangenberg, in Encyclopedia of Social Measurement, 2005
For the 17th-century physiocrats, living in a predominantly agrarian society, all wealth originated from nature (with land as a stand-in); the 18th-century Industrial Revolution changed the perception of wealth and prompted a labor theory of value (with capital regarded as embodied labor), and saving and consumption became an issue of heated debate. However, to avoid misunderstanding, the definitions of terms must be kept in mind: in classic economics, saving was understood to mean “the conversion of revenues into capital” (the term refers not to the process, but the result). Saving as “nonconsumption,” if used “productively,” equaled investment. Productive use of savings was entrepreneurial investment in productive, i.e., income-generating and capacity-enhancing, equipment and in technological improvements. Inspired by the labor theory of value, physical reproduction (procreation), improvement of living conditions, and caring for offspring were considered productive as well. Consequently, they were not classified as consumption as they would be today, but as saving/investment, contributing a minor and mostly undiscussed share to the dominant accumulation and investment regime, which created savings mainly out of previously earned profit.
The propensity to save has been explained in different, often complementary ways by different scholars. For instance, Adam Smith framed it as an institutionally and ideologically determined habit; John Stuart Mill saw it as a combination of habit, a desire to earn interest, and as investment or liquidity reserve. Because saving would be undertaken whenever possible, it was expected to be a function of the level of income and its distribution, i.e., of money availability (a hypothesis that can claim much empirical support, even in the mass-consumer society), and of investment opportunities. Of these two factors, promising investments were considered opportunities to drive the volume of saving: a shortage of investment opportunities led to (enforced) saving, stalled progress, and an increase in relative prices (thus creating new investment opportunities and providing an indirect mechanism leading to an equilibrium). Nearly two centuries after Adam Smith, J. Schumpeter suggested a similar theory, focused on innovation instead of on investment in general. Schumpeter proposed investments financed by money from savings (money, in his understanding, that was withdrawn from other productive uses) or by credits, which would create a demand for savings to balance them.
The alternative to the productive use of saving was not mass consumption, but unproductive “hoarding,” withdrawing money income from current expenditures without diverting it to nonconsumptive purposes. Because the purpose of owning money was not defined to be making more money, but to buy consumer goods, stockpiling money (e.g., to gain interest) instead of investing it in the national economy was considered improbable. The economist David Ricardo has warned that hoarding, leading to shortages of investment and demand, could be a permanent problem in a growing economy. In reality, the availability of opportunities to invest in real capital, the social taboo against squandering money, and the halo of saving leave little room for interest-based saving. Remember that given the prevailing income distribution of past centuries, only nobles and business people had money to save. Consumption, i.e., the nonproductive use of savings, was perceived as typically happening in service industries catering to the demand for luxuries by the wealthy classes (as already mentioned, subsistence expenditures were not considered consumption). Expenditures on imported luxury goods, jewelry, and artwork primarily did not help the national economy, i.e., were not productive, so consumption in this sense undermined development by impinging on the financial resources available for investment. Senghaas has empirically analyzed the conditions for economic development in a comparative study, and confirms that this phenomenon, if happening on a large scale, undermines the opportunities for economic success.
The tension between saving and consumption has been dealt with by different scholars in diverging ways. Economists such as Nassau W. Senior (1790–1864) focused on the conflict by promoting an “abstinence theory,” supporting the supply of saving by sacrifice of consumption for capital accumulation and for adding value to property. John Stuart Mill modified this by redefining abstinence as waiting, i.e., the sacrifice of forbearing to consume one's capital now, despite a time preference for immediate use, for the benefit of deliberate investment. Involuntary saving, then, happens in higher income brackets, if income exceeds the customary level of expenditure. Other economists, such as Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus, focused more on the cyclical flow between saving and consumption. The latter warned of overaccumulation resulting in underconsumption, stating that there was a significant risk if the propensity to save dominates the propensity to consume, as “saving, pushed to excess, would destroy the motive to production,” which is consumption. Once saving is encroaching on consumption, capital accumulates but risks secular stagnation. “Without exogenous spending by unproductive consumers the process of capital accumulation leads inevitably to secular stagnation.” This constitutes a permanent risk of underconsumption, i.e., the aggregate demand of consumers is not sufficient to buy all products at cost price, although the aggregate demand consists of consumption plus investment.
Adam Smith denied such a risk as a result of his perception of the economy as characterized by cyclical flows of money. His “saving-equals-consumption” theorem was based on a broader view of consumption, including household spending. It states that saving equals investment (i.e., nonconsumption) and results in salaries and income payments. These are in turn spent by consumption. Thus, saving creates effective demand as much as consumption expenditures do. Smith's theorem was formulated to undermine the diction that saving undermines consumption, assuming (1) that hoarding is a rare exemption, because money income (all!) is promptly spent, as “it is not for its own sake that men desire money, but for the sake of what they can purchase with it” (Wealth of Nations) and (2) that investment/saving generates purchasing power as much as luxury consumption does, i.e., the unproductive use of savings.
David Ricardo dealt with risks from saving by introducing the assumption that demands are insatiable: consumption would always rise with productivity growth. A sudden increase of saving would lead to growing capital, rising market wages, and, finally, rising consumption, and bringing consumption and saving into equilibrium again. This is rather close to Say's (Jean-Baptiste Say, 1767–1832) theorem that every supply creates its own demand (through wages spent to consume). The intention of economic actors is consumption, matching exactly the income they have gained, and entrepreneurship is considered a free service.
Choon Seong Leem, in Encyclopedia of Information Systems, 2003
I.B.3. Information Contents Industries
Information grew into contents after experiencing the days in primitive society, agrarian society, and industrial society. Contents are simply not information in itself, but are the contents accompanied with media.
Owing to the popularity of the Internet, anyone can process such contents easily, and the demand on supply of contents has continued to grow rapidly. Moreover, information contents industries, those industries processing contents appropriate to the customer, have developed.
Information contents industries are the set of enterprises that process collected information from the media and manufacture contents and software of various kinds. These include movie, television, radio, publication, etc. Recently, the on-line game industry, contents provider (CP) industry, and so forth are undergoing rapid development over the Internet, and in these industries many kinds of business models appear through the medium of the Internet.
So, information contents industries are classified into two categories according to the level of knowledge added and the object of application.
L. Wong, J.F.P. Bridges, in International Encyclopedia of Public Health, 2008
Current Global Consumer Movement
With an increasing global economy and economic development throughout the world transforming agrarian societies, consumer protection efforts are not isolated to a few countries. From advanced industrial to developing countries, consumer advocacy organizations and government agencies in over 113 countries address national and international consumer issues through membership in Consumer International, a consumer advocacy organization founded in 1960 (formerly the International Organization of Consumers Unions). Another example of global health-care policies shaped by the consumer movement is the European Patient Forum, a pan-European patient umbrella organization of patient groups active in advocating for patients' interests in public health and health policies debated by the European Commission. What are the forces behind this dual phenomenon of economic development and consumer protection? What do they predict for the health of the current and future global consumer?
To understand the forces that are shaping consumerism in health care, one model suggested by Ferrari (2004) identifies two necessary conditions – adequacy of information and consumer empowerment. Increasing these could lead to a more consumer-driven health-care system envisioned by Herzlinger (2004). Implicitly consumerism suggests a third condition: consumer choice, represented in Figure 1. A free market economy encouraged by consumerism would provide more information and a wider set of choices for consumers to make informed choices. But the potential for a consumer-driven health-care system may be undermined by the need for consumers to be organized against corporate interests, lack of competition to provide choices, and limited information on health-care financing mechanisms.
The key conditions required for consumerism to move beyond rhetoric can be summarized as a trilateral relationship among three factors: (1) adequacy of information, (2) consumer choice, and (3) consumer empowerment, in which high degrees of each condition are needed for the health-care system to be sensitive to patients as consumers. The relevance of these three conditions on current efforts in public health is evident (Figure 2). Information, choice, and power are three necessary conditions for consumerism to flourish in public health. These conditions mutually reinforce the role of consumers in their own health and health care. Information about health and treatment allows consumers to make informed choices for health-care purchases, which can drive the health-care market to offer drugs and health care that meet consumer preferences.
Henry Bernstein, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015
Development and Underdevelopment (1950s–70s)
The newly independent countries of Asia and Africa emerged from colonialism still largely agrarian societies but now committed to ‘national development’, as were most Latin American countries which were generally more industrialized. Modernizing agriculture was usually a central element of ideas about ‘national development’, if often subordinated to the desire for industrialization, seen as the principal economic basis of prosperity, modernity, and sovereignty. Giving it priority could mean substituting domestic grain production with cheap wheat imports from the USA (Friedmann, 1990), or ‘postponing’ agricultural modernization until the development of national industry could provide farmers with modern inputs, the dominant view in India for the first 20 years of independence before the ‘Green Revolution’ was launched.
During the peak period of ‘developmentalism’ – the pursuit of state-led development – from the 1950s to 1970s, a wide range of policy measures was adopted and applied by governments in the South to ‘modernize’ their agriculture. Agricultural policy was also used to try to resolve some of the social tensions and contradictions inherited from their colonial histories, no less in Latin America than in Asia and Africa. Thus, for example, land reforms, of very different kinds, were widespread in this period, as was government-imposed resettlement of rural populations (a familiar colonial practice), for example, in parts of Africa and Southeast Asia. The ‘integrated rural development programs’ of the 1970s, a comprehensive ‘package’ of education and health as well as economic services to the countryside, was promoted especially strongly by the World Bank and USAID (the US Agency for International Development), which some interpreted as their response to the success of a peasant-based and communist-led war of national liberation in Vietnam.
In this period, agricultural and more broadly rural development policies exhibited a lot of institutional variety and frequent ‘paradigm shifts’ or, more simply, changing fashions, as they do today. Despite their variety, policies and programs of modernization shared a core logic: promoting a more productive agriculture based in deepening commodity relations, whether through ‘smallholder’ development or larger scale farming, public and private. This was often pursued by governments in the South in ‘partnership’ with the World Bank, bilateral aid donors, notably the USA, Britain, and France, and private agribusiness capital (national and international), all of which supplied designs for modernization.
‘More productive’ addresses the technical conditions of farming, through improved varieties and cultivation methods, and greater fertilizer use, together with ‘soft’ credit and technical advice to farmers (extension services). This was typically done on a crop basis, whether for export crops or food crops, most famously the Green Revolution from the 1960s and its high yielding variety (HYV) seeds of the ‘big three’ grains of wheat, rice, and corn (or maize, the original ‘Green Revolution’ crop in the USA). The ‘package’ combined HYV seeds with fertilizers, requiring substantial irrigation to produce larger harvests.
‘Deepening commodity relations’ involves greater integration of farmers in markets, in which they specialize in producing particular commodities for sale, as well as buying and using greater quantities of means of production (‘modern’ inputs) and means of consumption, which often include food.
It is difficult to generalize about the effects of agricultural modernization efforts during the moment of ‘developmentalism’, because of the variety of policy measures, of their technical and institutional ‘packages’ and of government capacities in delivering them; and the even greater variety of ecological conditions and types of farming to which they were applied. In fact, assessing the impact of policies – a sizable profession in itself – is always challenging, because agricultural ‘performance’ is affected by many other factors too, from weather to the effects of macroeconomic policies (for example, and notably, concerning exchange rates of currencies and interest rates), to the vagaries of markets and prices, locally and internationally.
Agrarian political economy engaged with, and contributed to, the analysis of agrarian change and its policy debates in the moment of ‘developmentalism’. This partly drew from research on precapitalist agrarian formations in the South, paths of agrarian transition in now-developed countries, and colonial experiences of agrarian change and policies to promote it, all of which could be relevant to consideration whether capitalist agrarian transition was occurring and, if so, whether it was complete. Debate of agrarian change in the early decades of independence in Asia and Africa also highlighted a central tension between, on one side, those for whom modernization was a necessary component of agricultural growth, and its role in economic development more widely, requiring “peasant elimination” (Kitching, 2001) and, on the other side, “taking the part of peasants”, in Williams' succinct expression (1976). This resonates a tradition of agrarian populism as long as the histories of capitalist agriculture and industrialization (Kitching, 1982). Agrarian populism declares the virtues of peasant or family farmers and identifies with their struggles against those who threaten their reproduction and well-being, from merchants and banks, capitalist landed property, agrarian capital and agribusiness, to projects of state-led ‘national development’ centered on industrialization, in all their capitalist, nationalist, and socialist variants, of which the Soviet collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s was the most potent landmark. Its modern versions draw on the legacy of Chayanov, himself a victim of Stalin's purges, whose vision of a future ‘peasant utopia’ combined household farming with cooperation to achieve economies of scale (Bernstein, 2009, and references therein).
This historic, indeed almost constitutive, tension in agrarian political economy is expressed in debates over, for example, the character and effects of land reforms that claim to redistribute ‘land to the tiller’ (e.g., de Janvry, 1981; Byres, 2004); the political obstacles to taxation of capitalist farmers and rich peasants to generate an accumulation fund for industrialization (‘rural bias’ or at least class bias; e.g., Mitra, 1977); and in opposition to the latter the argument of ‘urban bias’ as the principal barrier to stronger growth by smallholder farmers, hence overcoming rural poverty (Lipton, 1977). In turn this was criticized as a (neo)populist ‘myth’ by Byres (1979). These kinds of questions, and attendant disagreements, carried over, and have intensified if anything, as the moment of state-led ‘developmentalism’ gave way to the ‘neoliberalism’ of market-driven doctrines and practices of development in the context of globalization since the 1970s (see below).
Edward A. Glickman, in An Introduction to Real Estate Finance, 2014
188.8.131.52.2 Births and Migration versus Death and Emigration
Steady population growth increases demand for goods and services and leads to economic growth. Agrarian societies require offspring to continue food production and support elders when they are no longer able to work. Countries with poor health care and high infant mortality require higher birth rates to ensure the survival of enough offspring to maintain food production. If countries with high population growth improve infant mortality, they can grow rapidly. In certain circumstances, this growth can create dire poverty; in other cases, rapid economic growth. The latter case has recently occurred in many formerly developing nations such as China, India, Brazil, and Malaysia.
Yvonne de Grandbois, in Service Science and the Information Professional, 2016
Agricultural, Industrial, and Post-Industrial Economies
The agricultural revolution began the world economy as we know it today. In an agrarian society the majority of the population lives and works on the land and produces its own food. The period between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw food production expand because of advances in tools and machinery as well as farming practices, like crop rotation for example. Efficiency improved, and surpluses in food production could be sold for profit. Wealth was based on land ownership and what the land produced. During the agricultural phase, towns and cities grew, and regions began to deal in commerce and trade.
The industrial phase refers to the widespread creation of new industries, and more generally to the radical transformation of the economy from farming to manufacturing. The most famous industrial revolution occurred in Britain during the mid-eighteenth century and spread to the rest of Europe and the United States within a few decades. Russia, China, and India experienced theirs later, by the late twentieth century. The industrial society is one in which wealth is produced by turning raw materials into products that are sold in the marketplace. Wealth is based on capital.
The post-industrial, or the information or knowledge economy brings us to the present time. Whereas the agricultural and industrial phases were based on the production of goods, the post-industrial is rooted in information and services. We have a shift here from physical products to knowledge, ideas, and literacy, and the work force is an educated one.
See more: Describe Two Disadvantages Of Early Forms Of Money, And Explain How They Could Have Been Fixed.
Peter B. Mayer, in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), 2008
Deeper Causes: Economic Transition from Traditional, Agrarian Societies to Industrialized Societies
It has long been evident from the experiences of Europe and North America that the transition from an agrarian society to an industrialized one is profoundly upsetting for a country. Not only are there large-scale physical movements of populations out of once-stable rural communities to burgeoning urban areas, but there are also profound psychological and social adjustments that are imposed. This period of transition is one in which social order is placed under the greatest strain. In developing countries the strains are even greater because popular political participation is better established than it was in nineteenth-century Europe, but there is as well the visible example of living standards in already-industrialized societies. These conditions have led theorists to propose the existence of a ‘revolution of rising expectations’. One influential analysis of why the military play such a significant role in developing societies is that offered by Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington, like many analysts, emphasizes the socially disruptive nature of modernization. Nation-states, political parties, and modern communications all act to undermine older forms of village and local authority. The fracturing of older institutions and loyalties unavoidably leads to increased conflict and violence in society. In effect, Huntington suggests, between the relative stabilities of traditional societies on the one hand and mature modernized societies on the other, there is a dangerous domain of modernizing transition that is characterized by political disorder and insurrection. There are two principal paths that traverse the zone of transition. There is a path of ‘civic politics’ where political institutions are relatively well developed. The alternative path, where institutionalism is weak, is that of ‘praetorianism’. Military intervention in politics is particularly common in praetorian societies. The political position of the military changes as society modernizes: “In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order” (Huntington, 1968: 221). In an earlier study Huntington argued that as societies become industrialized, their militaries will become increasingly professionalized and will consequently absorb and support the liberal democratic view that the military should serve and not dominate society. Though this view is widely cited, it is not clear that it helps explain a great deal about the behavior of military groups in developing countries. In Latin America in the 1970s, for instance, highly professional armies in Argentina and Chile overthrew democratically elected governments. In South Asia, the army created in British India was divided between India and Pakistan; while the Pakistani military over the past 50 years has overthrown several elected governments and retains a preponderant position in national politics, the Indian military has remained strictly subordinate to civilian authority.